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INTEGRA v. MERCK: EFFECTS ON THE COST 
AND INNOVATION OF NEW DRUG 
PRODUCTS 
Alison Ladd* 
INTRODUCTION 
The rising cost of pharmaceutical drugs is a concern of most 
consumers.1 Americans reportedly spent $125 billion on drugs in 
1999.2 The cost to discover and develop a new drug is similarly 
significant and is estimated at nearly $1.7 billion.3 Drugs are 
distinct from most other products entering the marketplace in that 
they must undergo extensive premarket approval by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) before reaching consumers.4 FDA 
approval is a lengthy process and takes, on average, 8.2 years.5 
Given that the cost of research and development cannot be 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.S., Cell & Structural Biology, 
University of Illinois–Urbana, 1996. The author would like to thank Eric Kirsch 
as well as the staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for their guidance and 
encouragement. Special thanks to Eric Parucki for his continued support, 
encouragement, and, most importantly, for his patience. 
1 David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 
22. 
2 Id. 
3 Ann M. Thayer, Blockbuster Model Breaking Down: Pharma Industry 
Reaches New Sales Peak, Despite Rising Costs and Bigger Challenges for Drug 
R&D, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, June 2004, at 23. 
4 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2004). 
5 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION 
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 33 (July 1998) [hereinafter CBO STUDY]. 
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recovered unless and until FDA approval is obtained, the research 
and development costs for a new drug result in a negative cash 
flow for pioneer drug companies.6 Consequently, only one out of 
5,000 possible new drugs is approved for sale and use.7 
The Patent Act provides pioneer, or innovative, drug 
companies with the right to patent new drugs.8 Patents enable 
pioneer drug companies to preclude others from making, using, 
importing, offering for sale, or selling their drugs in the United 
States.9 Further, patents provide pioneer drug companies with 
exclusive access to the marketplace, allowing the recovery of drug 
development costs.10 Problematically, however, the FDA approval 
process overlaps with the patent terms of new drugs and effectively 
shortens the period of market exclusivity enjoyed by these 
products. Pioneer drug companies thus face a reduced period in 
which to turn profits and recover research and development costs.11 
As a result, drug companies seek to recover these costs from 
consumers through higher product prices.12 
When the patent rights related to a new drug expire, generic 
drugs are permitted to enter and compete in the marketplace.13 
Generic drugs can be sold at much cheaper prices than their brand 
name counterparts, in part because their manufacturers can make 
use of existing research in developing drug formulas rather than 
originating this knowledge base. Through patent laws requiring 
                                                          
6 Id. at 14-15. 
7 PHARMACEUTICAL AND RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA 
(PHRMA), PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/2004-03-31.937.pdf 
[hereinafter PHRMA PROFILE 2003]. 
8 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). 
9 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the 
patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States . . . .”). 
10 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3. 
11 Id. at 3-4 
12 Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 
18 (2003). 
13 See CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 2. 
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full disclosure of patented inventions, generic drug manufacturers 
can obtain the patent submissions of brand name drugs and acquire 
the information necessary to develop and manufacture generic 
versions.14 Having benefited from lower development costs, 
generic drugs may enter the market with lower prices than their 
brand name rivals.15 Prior to 1984, however, generic drugs were 
prevented from entering the marketplace immediately upon the 
expiration of brand name drug patents and were required to 
undergo premarket approval by the FDA prior to sale.16 Patent law 
prohibited generic drug companies from engaging in premarket 
approval activities, including the manufacture or use of brand 
name drugs during their patent terms.17 Thus, premarket testing by 
generic drug manufacturers was delayed until the brand name 
patent had expired.18 
In 1984, in recognition of the need to control drug prices, 
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act.19 Commonly referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman 
Act,” after its two congressional sponsors, the legislation was 
intended to address the issue of rising drug prices by controlling 
the practices of brand name manufacturers and enabling generic 
                                                          
14 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975) states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
15 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1677 (2003). 
16 See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (holding that performance of experiments to derive FDA required test 
data, conducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the 
experimenter’s business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude 
others from using his patented invention). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
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manufacturers to participate more actively in the market.20 Section 
202 of the Act, codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),21 facilitates 
quicker market access for generic manufacturers.22 Section 
271(e)(1) has become known as the “safe harbor” provision to 
patent infringement, as it exempts from patent infringement all 
activities related to the gathering of information required for 
compliance with federal laws that regulate drugs and veterinary 
biological products.23 
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the safe harbor 
provision.24 Recently, the Federal Circuit in Integra LifeSciences I, 
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA25 narrowed the scope of section 271(e)(1) by 
excluding from the safe harbor all activities related to the 
preclinical development of new drugs.26 The court held that the 
                                                          
20 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I) (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647; 
see also Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act: The Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 91 (2002). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). This section states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological 
product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily 
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma 
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic 
manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products. 
Id. 
22 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2647. 
23 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
24 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1562 (D. Del. 1988) (stating that the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
“presents a question of law that has no clear answer”). 
25 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
26 The term “preclinical development,” as used by the Integra court, refers 
to the experiments that identified the best drug candidate “to subject to future 
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safe harbor does not reach “any exploratory research that may 
rationally form a predicate for future clinical tests.”27 This decision 
suggests that safe harbor protection is limited to generic drug 
manufacturers that seek FDA approval for products that compete 
with existing brand name drugs.28 The restriction of the safe harbor 
to generic drugs means that liability may be imposed on brand 
name drug manufacturers for activities they perform during the 
period preceding FDA approval. This disparity greatly affects the 
research and development of brand name drugs, as they must 
undergo a more rigorous FDA approval process than their generic 
competitors. As a result, brand name drug companies must 
confront costly burdens to pharmaceutical innovation. 
This note will examine the implications of the Integra decision 
for the discovery and development of new drugs. Part I discusses 
the interpretation of the safe harbor exemption in cases preceding 
the Integra decision. These decisions clarified the types of patents 
that are covered under the safe harbor29 and announced a 
“reasonably related use” test to guide the application of the 
exemption.30 Part II discusses the narrowing of the safe harbor 
exemption by the Federal Circuit in Integra. Part III examines the 
impact of the Integra decision on new drug innovation, with an 
emphasis on the difficulties posed by the patent licensing process. 
This section also explores the ways in which Integra has affected 
the landscape of patent infringement exemptions and patent term 
restoration and, more generally, competition between innovative 
and generic drug manufacturers. Finally, the note concludes that 
Integra may lead to a reduction in innovative research and 
development in the United States and suggests that it may be time 
                                                          
clinical testing under the FDA processes.” Id. at 865-67 (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 867. 
28 Id. (“The § 271(e)(1) safe harbor covers those pre-expiration activities 
‘reasonably related’ to acquiring FDA approval of a drug already on the 
market.”). 
29 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Abtox, Inc. v. 
Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
30 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 
1993); Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926 
(N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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to consider amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to broaden the scope 
of the safe harbor and lengthen patent term extensions for 
innovative drug manufacturers. 
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 
271(E)(1) 
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s primary purpose is twofold: “to 
make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a 
generic approval procedure for pioneer drugs”31 and “to create a 
new incentive for increased expenditures for research and 
development of certain products which are subject to premarket 
government approval.”32 Although the first of these goals is 
restricted to the regulation of drug products, the second goal is 
unclear in scope. The language of the safe harbor provision in 
section 271(e)(1) is similarly unclear with regard to the provision’s 
applicability to products other than drugs. In order to determine the 
scope of the safe harbor, courts have turned to the plain language 
and legislative history of the statute.33 Using these tools of 
statutory interpretation, courts have determined both the types and 
uses of patents covered by the safe harbor. 
A. Summary of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress explained that 
Title I of the Act would make available lower-priced generic 
versions of drugs by allowing for an abbreviated approval process 
for generic drugs, while Title II, by creating an additional patent 
term, would “act as a spur to develop innovative and, ultimately, 
less costly treatment for diseases.”34 The two titles of the 
legislation attempted to balance the interests of generic and 
                                                          
31 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2647. 
32 Id. at 15. 
33 United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); see Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
34 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2653. 
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innovative drug manufacturers.35 The act proposed two sets of 
changes: first, it implemented an abbreviated approval process for 
generic drugs, and second, it established patent term extensions for 
innovative drugs.36 The intended purpose of these changes was to 
foster greater competition in the drug industry and provide access 
to lower-cost generic drugs.37 
The abbreviated approval process for generic drugs eliminated 
the duplicative testing previously required for FDA approval of 
generic drugs.38 This abbreviated process is intended to extend 
approval to generic drugs, provided that the generic version is the 
same as the original drug or is so similar that the FDA can 
conclude that additional safety and effectiveness testing is 
unnecessary.39 In filing for FDA approval, the generic applicant is 
required to make a certification to the FDA regarding each patent 
that claims the brand name drug or method for its use.40 The four 
possible certifications are: I) the patent information has not been 
filed; II) the patent has expired; III) the date on which the patent 
will expire; and IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the applicant’s generic drug.41 Under the first or second options, 
the time of generic approval is not limited, as there is not a current 
valid patent covering the generic drug for which approval is 
sought. In contrast, under the third option, approval of the generic 
drug occurs only upon the expiration of the existing patent on the 
brand name drug. When making a certification under the fourth 
option, known as a Paragraph IV certification, the applicant is 
required to give notice to each owner of every patent covering a 
brand name drug that the generic manufacturer asserts to be invalid 
                                                          
35 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3. 
36 Id. 
37 Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance between the Interests of 
Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 51, 51-52 
(2003). 
38 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3. 
39 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48. 
40 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003). 
41 Id. 
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or not infringed.42 This notification requirement is designed to 
protect holders of valid drug patents by allowing the patent holder 
to sue the generic applicant for infringement.43 If an infringement 
action is timely brought within forty-five days after notice of 
Paragraph IV certification, the generic approval process is stayed 
for a thirty-month period.44 Yet, upon a successful Paragraph IV 
certification, the generic applicant receives 180 days of market 
exclusivity.45 
To balance the interests of generic and innovative drug 
manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act also provides for patent 
term restoration for certain products that are subject to premarket 
government approval.46 A patent term extension, or restoration, is 
intended to provide innovative manufacturers with an opportunity 
to make up the portion of the patent term that is lost during the 
regulatory approval of the patented drug.47 There are several 
notable limitations on the extensions afforded by the patent term 
restoration provision. First, extensions cannot exceed five years.48 
Additionally, extensions are capped at fourteen years from a 
product’s initial approval by the FDA.49 Moreover, a patent term 
extension can only be applied to the earliest patent claiming a 
particular product.50 
In providing innovative drug manufacturers with the benefit of 
patent term restoration, Congress also sought to prevent the de 
facto extension of an innovative drug’s patent term through delay 
                                                          
42 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2003); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 24 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2657. 
43 Id. 
44 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003). 
45 Id. § 355(j)(5)(A)(iv) (2003). 
46 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2648. The products which can gain the benefit of patent term restoration 
include human drugs, animal drugs, medical devices, and food and color 
additives. Id. 
47 Sarah M. Yoho, Reformation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an Unnecessary 
Resolution, 27 NOVA L. REV. 527, 536 (2003). 
48 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2002). 
49 Id. § 156(c)(3) (2002). 
50 Id. § 156(c)(4) (2002). 
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in the approval of generic drugs following the patent term’s 
expiration.51 This de facto extension of the innovative drug’s 
patent term was created because a generic manufacturer could not 
begin the testing necessary for FDA approval of the generic drug 
product prior to the expiration of the innovative drug’s patent, 
given that such testing was considered an infringing use.52 Thus, 
the patent holder retained exclusivity on the market after the 
expiration of the drug patent while the generic manufacturer was 
testing its generic drug for FDA approval. Section 202 of the Act, 
later codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), eliminates de facto 
extensions by providing that “it shall not be an act of infringement 
to make, use, or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information under a 
federal law which regulates the approval of drugs.”53 This 
provision is known as the safe harbor for patent infringement. 
B. Types of Patented Inventions Covered by the Safe Harbor 
In order to determine which patented inventions receive 
protection under the safe harbor provision, one must consider the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in its entirety. The phrase “patented 
invention,” as used in section 271(e)(1), is in no way limited to 
drug-related inventions.54 The safe harbor exemption should 
                                                          
51 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2679. 
It is the Committee’s view that experimental activity does not have any 
adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the 
life of a patent, but prevention of such activity would extend the patent 
owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration date. 
Id. 
52 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
53 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2678. 
54 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 
661, 556 (1990). The only types of patented inventions to which the statute does 
not apply are those pertaining to a new animal drug or veterinary biological 
product “which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, 
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site 
specific genetic manipulation techniques.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
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therefore be applied to any patented invention that would be 
infringed in the course of conducting activities related to the 
development and submission of information required by a federal 
law that regulates drugs and veterinary biological products.55 
Section 271(e)(1) makes no specific reference to other items 
covered by the FDCA, such as medical devices, food additives, or 
color additives.56 By contrast, the patent term extension applies to 
drugs, medical devices, food additives, and color additives.57 Yet, 
the definitions set forth in the FDCA for medical devices, food 
additives, and color additives are defined separately and distinctly 
from the definitions of drugs.58 Section 271(e)(1), therefore, does 
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
57 Id. § 156(f) (2004). 
58 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2004). 
The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, 
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or 
related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is —  
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States 
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or 
other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended 
purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the 
achievement of its primary intended purposes. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h). 
The term ‘food additive’ means any substance the intended use of 
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or 
indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the 
characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for use in 
producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, 
packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of 
radiation intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally 
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown 
through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in 
food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or 
experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the 
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not appear to cover medical devices, food additives, or color 
additives. Thus, the safe harbor exemption applies to only some of 
the products that receive the benefit of patent term restoration.59 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered whether Medtronic’s testing and marketing of an 
implantable cardiac defibrillator, a medical device used in the 
treatment of heart patients, was exempt from patent infringement 
                                                          
conditions of its intended use; except that such term does not include— 
(1) a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity 
or processed food; or (2) a pesticide chemical; or (3) a color additive; 
or (4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval 
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph pursuant to this Act, 
the Poultry Products Inspection Act or the Meat Inspection Act of 
March 4, 1907; (5) a new animal drug; or (6) an ingredient described in 
paragraph (ff) in, or intended for use in, a dietary supplement. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(s). 
The term ‘color additive’ means a material which— 
(A) is a dye, pigment, or other substance made by a process of 
synthesis or similar artifice, or extracted, isolated, or otherwise derived, 
with or without intermediate or final change of identity, from a 
vegetable, animal, mineral, or other source, and (B) when added or 
applied to a food, drug, or cosmetic, or to the human body or any part 
thereof, is capable (alone or through reaction with other substance) of 
imparting color thereto; except that such term does not include any 
material which the Secretary, by regulation, determines is used (or 
intended to be used) solely for a purpose or purposes other than 
coloring. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(1). 
The term ‘drug’ means (A) articles recognized in the official United 
States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the 
United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any 
of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended 
for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or 
(C). 
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
59 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 20-37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2653-70. 
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under section 271(e)(1).60 Focusing on what it perceived to be the 
intended purpose of the exemption, the Court applied the safe 
harbor to medical devices.61 The Supreme Court explained that, in 
using the language “the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law” to reference those preapproval 
activities that would be exempt under the safe harbor, Congress 
intended to refer to all activities related to “compliance with a 
comprehensive scheme of regulation.”62 The Court emphasized 
that if Congress had intended the safe harbor to apply exclusively 
to drug patents, there were “infinitely more clear and simple ways 
of expressing that intent.”63 The Court considered the patent term 
restoration and patent infringement exemption provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to be a single legislative package64 and 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended for the benefits of 
both provisions to apply to drugs, but only the patent term 
extension to apply to medical devices.65 
                                                          
60 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). Eli Lilly brought 
a patent infringement action to enjoin Medtronic’s testing and marketing of an 
implantable cardiac defibrillator. Id. Medtronic’s defense was that its alleged 
infringing activities were for the purpose of developing and submitting 
information for premarket approval of a medical device and was therefore 
exempt under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 666-67. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 670 n.3. 
65 Id. at 672-73. 
It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably 
aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval requirements 
in this entire area—dual distorting effects that were roughly offsetting, 
the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a more or less 
corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to 
address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other 
products . . . should enact provisions which not only leave in place an 
anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term but 
simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only 
failing to eliminate but positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year 
patent protection 
Id. 
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The decision in Eli Lilly discusses medical devices generally.66 
The FDCA, however, has established three classes of medical 
devices: Class I, Class II, and Class III.67 Of these three classes, 
only Class III is subject to rigorous premarket approval.68 Class I 
                                                          
66 See id. at 667-69. 
67 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2004). Class I devices, or general control devices, are 
those for which the controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
Class II devices, or special controls devices, are those which cannot be 
classified as a Class I device because the general controls by 
themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device. A Class II device requires 
sufficient information to establish special controls to provide such 
assurance, including the promulgation of performance standards, 
postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and 
dissemination of guidelines (including guidelines for the submission of 
clinical data in premarket notification). 
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
Class III devices require premarket approval. Class III devices are those 
which cannot be classified as a Class I device because insufficient 
information exists to determine that the application of general controls 
are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of the device, and cannot be classified as a Class II device 
because insufficient information exists to determine that the special 
controls would provide reasonable assurance of its safety and 
effectiveness. A Class III device that is purported or represented to be 
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or 
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury, is subject 
premarket approval to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and 
effectiveness. 
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
68 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2004). Class III devices require an approved 
application for premarket approval. Id. § 360e(a)(2). An application for 
premarket approval consists of full reports of all information, published or 
known or which should reasonably be known to the applicant, concerning 
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such device is safe 
and effective; a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and 
of the principle or principles of operation, of such device; a full description of 
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, 
processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of, such device; an 
identifying reference to any performance standard which would be applicable to 
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and Class II devices are subject to an abbreviated approval 
process.69 The Federal Circuit clarified the safe harbor exemption 
as it applies to medical devices in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.70 In 
that case, the court considered whether the safe harbor exemption 
applied to a patented device used to sterilize medical instruments.71 
The court determined that the safe harbor applies to Class II 
medical devices, even though their abbreviated premarketing 
approval process precludes them from being eligible for patent 
term extensions.72 
One court has argued for symmetry in the eligibility 
requirements for patent term restoration and the safe harbor 
exemption.73 In Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., 
the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that 
only those patents whose terms were eligible for patent term 
                                                          
any aspect of such device if it were a class II device, and either adequate 
information to show that such aspect of such device fully meets such 
performance standard or adequate information to justify any deviation from such 
standard; samples of such device and of components thereof, except where the 
submission of such samples is impracticable or unduly burdensome, the 
requirement may be met by the submission of complete information concerning 
the location of one or more such devices readily available for examination and 
testing; specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device; and any 
other information relevant to the subject matter of the application. Id. § 
360e(c)(1). 
69 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352, 360f (2004). All classes of devices cannot be an 
adulterated, misbranded, or banned device. Id. Manufacturers or importers of 
Class I devices must give notice to the FDA, as well as maintaining records and 
reports to assure that the device is not adulterated or misbranded or to otherwise 
assure its safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360h, 360i (2004). Class II 
devices require promulgation of performance standards and, postmarket 
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines 
recommendations, and other appropriate actions 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(B), 
360d (2004). 
70 Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
71 Id. 
72 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002); See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe 
Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Shelter Pioneer Drug Manufacturers?, 53 
FOOD DRUG L.J. 643, 654 (1998). 
73 Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. 
Wis. 1999). 
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extensions would be immune from infringement under the safe 
harbor.74 The court argued that “the patent term extension is the 
quid pro quo for the protection from infringement actions and vice 
versa.”75 Thus, under Infigen, research conducted to support FDA 
approval is not immune from infringement liability for patents that 
cannot benefit from patent term restoration. The decision in Infigen 
ignores the Supreme Court precedent established in Eli Lilly.76 The 
Supreme Court did not inextricably link the type of patents covered 
by the safe harbor to those eligible for term extensions.77 To the 
contrary, the Court recognized that there could be situations in 
which a patent gains the benefit of a term extension without the 
disadvantage of infringement exemption, and others in which the 
disadvantage will be suffered without the benefit.78 
C. Types of Uses Covered by the Safe Harbor 
In addition to determining the types of patents protected by the 
safe harbor of section 271(e)(1), courts were also charged with 
interpreting which infringing uses of patented subject matter 
merited the benefit of the safe harbor. In Scripps Clinic & 
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., the Northern District of 
California became the first court to consider the types of uses 
covered by the safe harbor exemption.79 The court focused on the 
“solely for” language of section 271(e)(1).80 The section, by its 
plain language, allows for an infringement exemption for the use 
of a patented invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the 
                                                          
74 Id. at 980. 
75 Id. 
76 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 671-73. 
79 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 
(N.D. Cal. 1987). Scripps Clinic brought an infringement action on their 
patented protein, Factor VIII:C, that causes human blood to clot. Id. Genentech 
argued that their uses of Factor VIII:C, though not solely for the purposes 
related to FDA testing, had some reasonable relationship to such purposes and 
therefore did not infringe under section 271(e)(1). Id. 
80 Id. See supra note 21 for language of the statute. 
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development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.”81 The court determined that in order for an 
infringing use to be exempt, the use of the patent need only be 
related to the generation of information that would meet the FDA’s 
requirements for drug approval.82 However, if the use is also 
related to other ventures, such as preparations for patent filings or 
agreements in preparation for commercial manufacturing, the use 
of the patent will no longer be exempt from infringement.83 
This interpretation was soon criticized for limiting the safe 
harbor to activities that are “solely related” rather than “reasonably 
related” to FDA approval.84 Courts subsequently adopted a test for 
infringing uses that seized on the “reasonably related” language 
rather than the “solely for” language of section 271(e)(1).85 
The test for a reasonably related use was set forth by the 
Northern District of California in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, 
Inc.86 Intermedics alleged that various activities in connection with 
the development of Ventritex’s implantable defibrillator were acts 
of infringement.87 These activities included the manufacture of the 
                                                          
81 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (2003). 
82 Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. 1379. 
83 See id. at 1396. 
84 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1562, 1565 (D. Del. 1988). The issue before the court was “whether 
any foreign activities can be ‘reasonably related’ to FDA drug approval.” Id. 
The court looked to the legislative history of section 271(e)(1) and found that it 
did not “provide guidance on what activities are ‘reasonably related’ to FDA 
drug approval.” Id. The court then criticized the decision in Scripps v. 
Genentech for “interpret[ing] the statute to only cover activities that were ‘solely 
related’ to FDA approval and did not consider what acts are ‘reasonably related’ 
to it.” Id., citing Scripps v. Genentech, 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
85 Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926, 
1932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that the word “solely” in § 271(e)(1) 
modifies “uses” not “reasonably related”); Intermedics v. Ventritex Co., 26 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
86 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). 
87 Id. at 1282; see supra Part I.B for discussion of the safe harbor as it 
applies to medical devices. 
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defibrillator, its sale to hospitals, and the demonstration of the 
device at trade shows.88 The court found that all of these activities 
were reasonably related to the performance of clinical trials 
necessary for FDA approval of the defibrillator.89 The court looked 
to Congress’s acknowledgement that the types and quantities of 
information required by the FDA for approval will not always be 
clear.90 Thus, the court held that the “reasonably related” language 
was intended to provide latitude to those who seek FDA approval 
in making judgments about the nature and extent of otherwise 
infringing activities.91 The court recognized that the exemption 
should not be lost because activities either fail to generate 
information that interests the FDA or generate more information 
than is necessary.92 
The reasonably related use test broadened the scope of section 
271(e)(1). The test set out by the Intermedics court asks whether 
the use in question could reasonably contribute to the generation of 
information of the type that would likely be required for FDA 
approval.93 This test, by not limiting the exemption to infringing 
uses that actually result in information for submission to the FDA, 
provides innovators with a more generous safe harbor with which 
to protect themselves against infringement allegations. Further, this 
test gives safe harbor to drug manufacturers that use a patented 
invention to obtain information relevant to FDA approval, even if 
the information gained from the infringing use is also used for 
other purposes.94 
                                                          
88 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1282. 
89 Id. at 1282-88. 
90 Id. at 1280. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that there is not a requirement in the statute [35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] that disclosure of information to persons other than the FDA 
would “repeal” the exemption to patent infringement); see also Abtox, Inc. v. 
Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that the statutory 
language [of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] allows the would-be infringer “to use its 
data for more than FDA approval”). 
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Although this test disregards the word “solely” as it appears in 
the statute, it is clear from the legislative history that information 
obtained from infringing uses need not be submitted to the FDA in 
order to qualify for the exemption.95 Until the decision in Integra, 
the decisions discussing the exempted uses of a patented invention 
under the safe harbor gave little or no significance to the word 
“solely” in favor of a broad “reasonably related” test. Under this 
interpretation, innovative drug developers were given more leeway 
in their research activities, given that the fruits of their research 
activities would retain the protection of the safe harbor, even if the 
resulting information had possible uses other than FDA 
submission. 
II. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. V. MERCK KGAA 
Before Integra, courts generally gave broad reach to the 
activities and types of patents that could be covered under the safe 
harbor.96 Specifically addressing the applicability of the safe 
                                                          
95 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2678 (“A party which develops such information, but decides not to 
submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development was 
done to determine whether or not an application for approval would be 
sought.”). The court in Intermedics elaborated on what they considered 
Congress’ intent to actually have been. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 
F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The court states that the phrase 
“reasonably related” “reflects Congress’ acknowledgement that it will not 
always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new product 
exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to win 
that agency’s approval.” Id. The court went on to state: 
[W]e do not believe that Congress intended a party to lose the 
exemption simply because it turns out, after the fact, that some of that 
party’s otherwise infringing ‘uses’ either failed to generate information 
in which the FDA was interested or generated more information that 
turned out to be necessary to secure FDA approval. 
Id. 
96 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Abtox, Inc. 
v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. 
Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. 
AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De. 2002); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 
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harbor to innovative drug development, the Southern District of 
New York in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 
Inc.97 found that the use of a patented invention for research and 
development of a new drug can be afforded the protection of the 
safe harbor.98 The court looked to Congress’s stated desire to 
encourage innovation and bring new drugs to the market in a 
quicker fashion.99 Nearly two years later, the Federal Circuit in 
Integra denied safe harbor to the research and development of new 
drugs, effectively narrowing the protection afforded to innovative 
drug manufacturers.100 The Integra decision brings the scope of the 
exemption back in line with the initial interpretation by Scripps 
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.101 As previously 
discussed, the Scripps court focused on the “solely for” limitation 
of the statute, rejecting a broad construction that would immunize 
“any use of a patented invention so long as some aspect of that use 
is reasonably related to FDA testing.”102 This “solely for” test was 
later rejected by other district courts, which adopted the reasonably 
related use test set forth by the Northern District of California in 
Intermedics.103 
                                                          
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. 
Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 
1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
97 Bristol-Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361. 
98 Id. at *19-20. 
99 Id. at *10. 
100 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
101 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 
(N.D. Cal. 1987). 
102 Id. at 1396. 
103 Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 1999 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204-5 
(D. Del. 2002) (stating that activities only exceed the scope of the §271(e)(1) 
exemption when they have no objectively reasonable application towards 
obtaining FDA approval); Bristol-Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at *12-
13 (denying summary judgment on the basis that a reasonable jury could 
conclude uses of the patented invention were reasonably related to the 
submission of information to the FDA); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Uses . . . may be related 
to FDA approval, and yet be conducted for purposes other than, or in addition 
to, obtaining FDA approval.”). 
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A. District Court Decisions Prior to Integra v. Merck 
The decision in Integra is a clear break from the line of cases 
dealing with the infringement exemption for preclinical drug 
discovery.104 Integra was the first appellate court decision to 
address the safe harbor since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Eli Lilly.105 In the thirteen years between Eli Lilly and Integra, 
three district courts addressed the application of the safe harbor to 
preclinical development of innovative products.106 Each of the 
three courts concluded that the safe harbor applied to these 
activities.107 Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent cases, Integra overrules each of these 
district court decisions, even though there was no disagreement 
among the district courts regarding the applicability of the safe 
harbor to preclinical development.108 
In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the District 
Court of Massachusetts became the first court to apply the safe 
                                                          
104 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Nexell 
Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De. 2002); Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, 
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
105 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
106 Nexell Therapeutics, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 197; Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS at *1; Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 104. 
107 Nexell Therapeutics, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 205; Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS at *19-20; Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
108 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2002) (covering the right to a civil action to obtain a 
patent); 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2002) (granting the remedy of a civil action to any 
party to a patent interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference); 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2002) 
(deals with the adjustment of patent terms); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (1999) 
(stating in pertinent part that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision of 
a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or 
154(b) of title 35”); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1992) (stating in pertinent part that 
“[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent 
infringement”). 
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harbor to an innovative drug product.109 In that case, Hoechst had 
used Amgen’s patented protein product, erythropoietin (EPO), to 
facilitate the development of GA-EPO, a competing but novel 
product.110 The court held that the safe harbor exemption applied 
to a variety of Hoechst’s activities, which it deemed relevant to the 
FDA approval process.111 The court emphasized that the use of a 
patented invention must be reasonably related to FDA approval, 
but need not be for the exclusive purpose of FDA approval.112 The 
court also clarified that to fall within the safe harbor of section 
271(e)(1), the making, using, or selling of a patented invention 
must be “in ways that objectively bear reasonable prospects of 
yielding information that might be relevant in the FDA approval 
process.”113 
Three years later, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 
Inc. followed and expanded upon the decision in Amgen.114 There, 
the court held that the use of patented intermediates by Bristol-
Myers Squibb (BMS) in the development of new drugs was 
exempt from infringement under the safe harbor.115 The court 
found that it was objectively reasonable for BMS to believe that 
there was a “decent prospect” that the use of the patented 
intermediates would contribute, in a relatively direct manner, to the 
generation of information upon which the FDA could base 
approval of the newly discovered drug.116 The court reasoned that 
even though each use of the patented intermediates by BMS in 
                                                          
109 Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 104. 
110 Id. at 106. 
111 Id. at 113. Hoechst’s activities included a multitude of studies on GA-
EPO that the company argued were required for FDA approval, including purity 
studies, consistency studies, characterization studies, and viral clearance tests. 
These studies were done in comparison with Amgen’s EPO product. Id. at 109-
11. 
112 Id. at 108. 
113 Id. 
114 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 
8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001). 
115 Id. at *19. 
116 Id. at *19-20, quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 
1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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early stage research might not have yielded information that could 
be submitted to the FDA, the uses related to this preliminary 
activity could facilitate the generation of information that later 
would be submitted.117 Furthermore, the court determined that 
eligibility for the safe harbor exemption should not be delayed 
until after a candidate drug has been selected or designated as the 
subject of an application for FDA approval.118 The court explained 
that if selection or filing of a candidate drug were required, the 
exemption would never apply because the underlying research and 
development necessary for FDA approval could never be 
undertaken.119 
Finally, in Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp, the 
District Court of Delaware considered the application of the safe 
harbor to an innovative product.120 Nexell differs from the two 
                                                          
117 Id. at *25. 
118 Id. at *23. 
119 Id. at *23-24. In response to Rhone-Poulenc Rorer’s argument that the § 
271(e)(1) exemption only applies after a particular drug candidate has been 
selected or filed with the FDA, Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that the exemption 
must apply to all activities reasonably related to an actual or possible FDA 
application: 
It would be nonsensical for the exemption to apply only in the 
development process after a drug candidate was identified, or after a 
drug candidate was actually filed with the FDA. If so, the exemption 
would never be reached because the underlying preliminary research 
and development work could not be undertaken. 
Id. at *23. The court also looked to the report of the Special Master, who had 
been appointed to the case, given the district court judge’s absence due to major 
surgery. Id. at *2. The report found that the uses of the patented invention were 
reasonably related to an FDA application: 
(1) even where each such use does not directly result in an FDA 
application being filed, so long as the use was made in order to 
determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought; 
and (2) even though each such use of the patented intermediates may 
not directly yield information that could be submitted to the FDA, but 
relates to a preliminary activity that may facilitate or be useful in 
generating information that could be submitted to the FDA. 
Id. at *24. 
120 Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De. 
2002). 
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previous cases in that it deals with a medical device rather than a 
drug.121 Nexell argued that AmCell had used its patented 
antibodies in the development of a magnetic cell-separating 
device.122 The court found that AmCell’s diverse activities were 
either exempt because they were carried out in relation with 
ongoing FDA trials or were insulated from infringement liability 
because they were conducted pursuant to the FDA approval 
process.123 The Rhone-Poulenc, Hoechst, and Nexell cases signaled 
a preference for a broad interpretation of the safe harbor 
provision—a trend that has been largely reversed by the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Integra. 
B. Integra v. Merck 
On July 18, 1996, Integra filed a complaint against Merck for 
patent infringement in the Southern District of California. Integra 
owns five patents related to a short tri-peptide known as an RGD 
peptide.124 These peptides are known to bind to αVβ3 receptors on 
the surface of cells.125 A researcher at Scripps Research Institute 
                                                          
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 198. 
123 Id. at 207-8. Amcell’s activities included sending information to 
physicians to recruit clinicians to participate in FDA studies; maintaining a 
booth at the American Society of Hematology featuring a display of the device; 
advertising in medical journals; soliciting clinicians through Amcell’s website; 
and providing the device to FDA-approved clinical investigators. Id. at 199. 
124 U.S. Patent No. 5,695,997 (issued Dec. 9, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 
4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991); U.S Patent No. 4,879,237 (issued Nov. 7, 
1989); U.S Patent No. 4,792,525 (issued Dec. 20. 1988); U.S Patent No. 
4,789,734 (issued Dec. 6, 1988). 
125 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). RGD peptides are a short tri-peptide segment of fibronectin (an 
adhesive protein) having the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp (in single-letter 
notation, RGD). Id. The RGD peptide sequence promotes beneficial cell 
adhesion by interacting with αVβ3 receptors on cell surface proteins called 
integrins. Id. The RGD sequence attaches to the αVβ3 receptors on the surfaces 
of cells. Id. at 862-63. This bond adheres the cells to the substrate containing 
RGD. Id. at 863. Inducing better cell adhesion and growth promotes wound 
healing and biocompatibility of prosthetic devices. Id. In addition, blood vessels 
grow new branches due to controlled interactions with integrins. Id. 
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(Scripps) discovered that blocking these αVβ3 receptors could have 
therapeutic uses in inhibiting tumor growth.126 Following this 
discovery, Merck KGaA (Merck) entered into an agreement with 
Scripps to fund “the necessary experiments to satisfy the biological 
bases and regulatory (FDA) requirements for the implementation 
of clinical trials” using a certain cyclic RGD peptide developed at 
Scripps, or derivatives thereof.127 A derivative of this peptide was 
later chosen for clinical development.128 In its case before the 
Southern District of California, Integra asserted that the agreement 
between Merck and Scripps was commercial in nature and that 
research conducted pursuant to that agreement was an infringement 
of its patents.129 After trial, a jury found Merck liable for the 
infringement of four of Integra’s patents.130 
Merck appealed to the Federal Circuit from the jury’s verdict 
of infringement.131 The company asserted that the district court had 
erroneously interpreted section 271(e)(1).132 In its review of the 
lower court’s interpretation of the statute, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
126 Id. at 863. 
127 Id. Merck KGaA began funding research at Scripps in 1988 when Dr. 
Cheresh, a researcher at Scripps, identified a monoclonal antibody that had 
activity as an inhibitor of integrin activity. Id. The collaboration was enlarged in 
1995 when Dr. Cheresh discovered that a Merck-provided peptide, having the 
sequence c(RGDfV), inhibits new blood vessel growth by interaction with a 
specific integrin. Id. In this collaboration, cyclic RGD peptides were synthesized 
and studied. Id. It was found that some cyclic RGD peptides have anti-
angiogenic properties, of interest for the treatment of a host of diseases, 
including cancer, macular degeneration, and rheumatoid arthritis. Id. 
“Angiogenic” refers to the process of generating new blood vessels, a process 
essential to tumor growth. Id. The purpose of the collaborative research was to 
(1) assess the potential efficacy of the peptides as therapeutic agents; (2) 
discover the mechanism of the action of the peptides; and (3) shed light on the 
histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion, and half-life of the peptides in 
the blood stream. Id. The ultimate goal of the research was to find a product that 
would be sufficiently effective in the treatment of angiogenic disease that could 
be developed and brought to market. Id. at 873-74. 
128 Id. at 863. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 864. 
132 Id. 
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announced that the term “solely” limits the safe harbor exemption 
from extending beyond uses of patented inventions that are 
reasonably related to those specified in section 271(e)(1).133 The 
court further explained that the limitation created by the term 
“solely” was essential because “activities that do not directly 
produce information for the FDA are already straining the 
relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor.”134 The safe 
harbor’s central purpose was explained as an express objective to 
facilitate the immediate entry of generic drugs into the 
marketplace.135 The court thus held that “[t]he safe harbor does not 
reach any exploratory research that may rationally form a predicate 
for future FDA clinical tests.”136 
Two rationales support the court’s holding. First, the court 
noted that the FDA has no interest in the general “hunt” for new 
drugs.137 Rather, it is concerned with specific drugs for which 
approval is being sought.138 Second, the court held that Congress 
had narrowly tailored the safe harbor in order to ensure only a de 
minimis impact on patent holders’ rights.139 This de minimis 
impact was protected by limiting safe harbor protection to those 
activities that are reasonably related to the FDA approval of a drug 
already on the market.140 The court therefore concluded that 
Merck’s activities, which were not related to a drug already on the 
market, did not fall under the safe harbor.141 
The court also argued that if the safe harbor exemption was 
                                                          
133 Id. at 866. Section 271(e)(1) allows exemption from infringement for 
patented inventions “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates . . . drugs or 
veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
134 Integra, 331 F.3d at 866. 
135 Id. at 866-67. 
136 Id. at 867. 
137 Id. at 866. In using the word “hunt” the court elaborated upon its 
meaning by saying that “the FDA does not require information about drugs other 
than the compound featured in an Investigational New Drug application.” Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 867. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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expanded to include Merck’s activities, it would “effectively 
vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool 
patents.”142 The court explained that many patents cover tools that 
are used to facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs 
and to test the safety of those newly identified drugs.143 The court 
acknowledged that such tools fall within the safe harbor when used 
for clinical testing required for FDA approval, yet argued that they 
would hold little commercial benefit to the patent holder if they 
fell within the safe harbor when used to support general 
research.144 The court then held that if section 271(e)(1) was 
“exaggerated,” it “would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent 
Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions.”145 
III. THE PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF THE INTEGRA DECISION 
The decision in Integra poses new challenges for the 
innovative drug industry. Problematically, Integra has created a 
greater need for innovators to license patents for research and 
development. With little or no protection from the safe harbor, 
innovators will face great liability from the owners of research tool 
patents, which are essential to innovative research. This is 
especially likely, given that the common-law research exemption 
has recently been narrowed and that no statutory experimental use 
exemption exists in the United States. The patent term restorations 
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act have proved similarly 
unavailing in aiding the recovery of research and development 
costs by innovative drug manufacturers, as they fail to cover the 
entire period lost to the regulatory approval process. Finally, the 
cumulative effect of these problems could stifle competition or, 
alternatively, drive innovators to perform their research abroad, 
where patent laws are more amenable to innovative research. 
                                                          
142 Id. (explaining that patented tools facilitate general research in 
identifying and testing the safety of new drugs). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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A. Integra Creates Problems for Patent Licensing 
Integra has established that the safe harbor does not reach 
down the chain of experimentation to embrace preclinical drug 
discovery.146 Yet Integra fails to elaborate at what point research 
moves from the preclinical research phase to a development stage 
that is reasonably related to FDA approval and, thus, becomes 
eligible for the infringement exemption. Specifically, the court 
fails to enunciate which forms of experimentation reasonably 
contribute to the production of information for FDA approval such 
that the safe harbor would apply.147 Although the court did not 
expressly limit the safe harbor exemption to generic drugs, it failed 
to discuss the applicability of the safe harbor to innovators prior to 
submission of a new drug candidate to the FDA.148 The decision in 
Rhone-Poulenc indicated that the designation or filing of a 
candidate drug is not a prerequisite to obtaining exemption under 
the safe harbor.149 Yet the Integra court seems to suggest that this 
might now be the case.150 
The Integra court expressly acknowledged that the cumulative 
effect of the number of patent licenses required to develop a drug 
can be substantial.151 In addition to the high costs associated with 
obtaining numerous licenses, manufacturers also might face the 
resistance of patentees who refuse to license their technologies, 
thereby blocking entire research programs.152 Moreover, 
innovative drug companies will face the problematic concern of 
predicting which patents they must license prior to embarking on a 
                                                          
146 Id. 
147 Charles Raubicheck, Integra v. Merck: A Mixed Bag for Research Tool 
Patents, 21 NATURE 1099, 1100 (Sept. 2003). 
148 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867; see also Raubicheck supra note 147. 
149 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, No. 95 Civ. 8833, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19362, at *23 (Nov. 27, 2001). 
150 Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67. 
151 Id. at 871. 
152 See Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra LifeSciences v. 
Merck – Good for Research or Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 462, 470 (2003). 
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new research project.153 The unresolved issue of what, if any, 
activity by innovative researchers is covered by the safe harbor 
leaves the innovative drug industry in a precarious situation. This 
uncertainty requires innovators to make educated guesses 
regarding which patents they must license in order to perform the 
necessary research to develop new drugs. In seeking to protect the 
rights of patent holders, Integra may have created a curious set of 
circumstances: the use of a patented invention for drug discovery 
will result in liability for patent infringement, whereas the use of 
the same invention after designation of a candidate drug will be 
immune.154 Researchers thus will be saddled with questions 
regarding how licensing can be effectuated if, as research and 
development activities progress, their activities unknowingly move 
from being susceptible to infringement liability to being immune 
under the safe harbor. 
Further, innovation may be hindered by the numerous patents 
that must be used in order to develop a new drug.155 A company’s 
research potential hinges on the company’s ability to access 
existing patents.156 Pharmaceutical development requires the use of 
a large number of basic research tools and laboratory techniques. 
The potential liability associated with and the cost of innovative 
research is greatly increased by a rise in the number of patents 
pertaining to research tools.157 Given that research tool patents 
                                                          
153 See id. 
154 Paul Fehlner, Not Such a Safe Harbor After All, 10 No. 6 ANDREWS 
INTEL. PROP. LIT. REP. 18 (July 22, 2003). 
155 Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental 
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2001). 
156 Kyla Dunn, A Look at . . . Patents & Biotech, WASH. POST, Oct. 1 2000, 
at B3 (summarized statement of Robert Lanza, the vice president of medical and 
scientific development of a small biotech company called Advanced Cell 
Technology) (“[A] company’s research can be determined not only by what it 
would most like to accomplish, but by which patents it is able to access.”). 
Research tools have been defined by the National Institutes of Health’s Working 
Group on Research Tools as “the full range of resources that scientists use in the 
laboratory.” Mueller, supra note 153, at 11-12. 
157 See Mueller, supra note 155, at 7-9; see also Donald R. Ware, Research 
Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 270 (2002). 
LADD MACROED FINAL 2-16-05.DOC 3/8/2005 12:56 PM 
 PATENT LAW AND NEW DRUG DISCOVERY 339 
cover a vast range of products and processes necessary for 
identifying and evaluating new drug products,158 manufacturers 
must now secure multiple licenses to perform innovative research 
on new drugs.159 
However, researchers experience acute difficulties in accessing 
patented research tools in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries.160 Researchers in these industries generally require 
access to a greater number of proprietary research tools to conduct 
their research than their counterparts in other fields.161 Research 
tool patents, which now cover an increasing number of processes, 
expose innovative drug companies to potential patent infringement 
liability and may entitle patent holders to injunctive relief.162 
Moreover, patentees are free to refuse licenses to their research 
tools and are likely to refuse requests for licenses from both 
competitors and small companies.163 Even when a patent holder is 
amenable to licensing, license negotiation is time consuming and 
the price demanded by the patent holder can sometimes prevent 
successful negotiations.164 Licensing costs and risks may prove so 
great as to impede, postpone, or even halt the development of new 
                                                          
158 Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the 
Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 349-50 (2004). See also Mueller, supra 
note 155, at 11. 
159 Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 152, at 470. 
160 See Mueller, supra note 155, at 11-12; see also Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 
237 (2004) (No. 03-1237), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/ 
2004/2pet/6invit/2003-1237.pet.ami.inv.html (“If licensing were always a 
realistic solution, however, Section 271(e)(1) would be altogether unnecessary, 
because a researcher could always license any patented technology.”). 
161 Id. 
162 Ware, supra note 157, at 270. 
163 Desmond Mascarenhas, Negotiating the Maze of Biotech “Tool 
Patents”, 16 NATURE BIOTECH. 1371 (Dec. 1998). The author explains that 
“large corporations often do not feel it is worth spending the time negotiating a 
license with a small outfit whose product may never even succeed in getting to 
the marketplace.” Id. He also indicates that patent holders tend to ignore 
attempts by competitors to license their technologies. Id. 
164 Id.; Mueller, supra note 155, at 16. 
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drugs.165 
Patent holders of biological research tools have attempted to 
maximize the benefits of their patents by seeking licensing 
royalties based on the sale of commercial products that are 
discovered and brought to market using those tools.166 These 
royalties are known as “reach-through royalties,”167 as they give 
the research tool patent owner the right to royalties on subsequent 
discoveries.168 Reach-through royalty licenses are common, given 
that they are more profitable and easier to enforce than licenses 
based solely on the sale or use of the research tool.169 As a matter 
of public policy, however, patents should not be used to prohibit 
research activities beyond what their patent specifications disclose 
and claim.170 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
grant of a patent license is limited to the payment of royalties on 
products within the scope of the patent.171 This restriction is 
intended to prevent a patentee’s extending the monopoly of his 
patent to derive a benefit not attributable to the patent’s 
teachings.172 
The Integra court argued that the expansion of the safe harbor 
to include the preclinical development of new drugs “would 
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning 
biotechnology tool patents.”173 Yet the plain wording of the safe 
                                                          
165 Mueller, supra note 155, at 7. 
166 Gerald J. Flattmann & Jonathon M. Kaplan, Licensing Research Tool 
Patents, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 945 (Sept. 2002). 
167 Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke Univ.: Shattering the Myth of 
Universities’ Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 180 
(2004). 
168 Derzko, supra note 158, at 357; Cai, supra note 167. 
169 See Derzko, supra note 158, at 357. 
170 David Alban, Rambus v. Infineon: Patent Disclosures in Standard-
Setting Organizations, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 309, 318 (2004); see also 6-19 
CHISUM ON PATENTS §19.04 (2004). 
171 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
172 Id. 
173 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
[P]atented tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate 
drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments on those new 
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harbor provision of section 271(e)(1) appears to protect the use of 
patented research tools in the development of a drug so long as the 
use is reasonably related to submission of information to the FDA 
for regulatory approval.174 The plain wording of the statute is very 
broad and does not limit the type of patented inventions it 
encompasses.175 There is no limitation in the statute that requires 
the patented invention to be the same as the product undergoing 
regulatory review,176 as would be the case with the testing of a 
generic drug for FDA approval prior to the expiration of the brand 
name drug’s patent. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Eli Lilly 
found that the phrase “patented invention,” as used in the statute, 
includes all inventions, not simply drug-related inventions, let 
alone generic drugs.177 Integra’s determination that the safe harbor 
applies only to FDA approval of drugs already on the market and 
not to the development of new drugs runs contrary to established 
Supreme Court precedent178 and the plain wording of section 
271(e)(1). 
Complex and restrictive licensing of research tool patents 
threatens to impede new drug discovery and development.179 Both 
scientific progress and new drug innovation are at stake. Under the 
present system, reach-through royalties reduce the profits of 
innovative drug companies that seek to recover the costs of new 
                                                          
drugs. Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls 
within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only supply some 
commercial benefit to the inventor when applied to general research. 
Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the whole 
benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological 
inventions. 
Id. 
174 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
175 Id. 
176 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 
U.S. 661, 664-68 (1990). 
177 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665. 
178 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). This apparent transgression from Supreme Court precedent was 
noted in Integra by Judge Newman in her dissent. Id. at 877, citing Eli Lilly, 496 
U.S. at 661 (“[T]he statute has been interpreted as of broader scope.”). 
179 Flattmann, supra note 166, at 945-46. 
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drug research and development.180 Although the Integra court did 
not opine on the legitimacy of reach-through royalties, it did 
acknowledge the cost to innovative drug companies of licensing 
research tools patents.181 However, by interpreting the safe harbor 
to exclude the use of research tool patents in the preclinical 
development of new drugs, the Integra decision diminishes the 
incentive for drug manufacturers to innovate.182 With frightening 
consequences, the Integra decision overlooks Congress’s stated 
intent of encouraging innovation and accelerating the introduction 
of new drugs to the market.183 
B. The Narrowing of Patent Infringement Research Exemptions 
Critics argue that patents on drug discovery tools stifle research 
and innovation.184 For example, research tool patent holders may 
impede technological progress by limiting the use of their tools to 
research that is most beneficial to them at the expense of new drug 
research and development that is beneficial to society.185 This 
argument is bolstered by the fact that a common law experimental 
                                                          
180 See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants 
and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: 
Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72090, 72091 (Dec. 23, 1999). 
181 Integra, 331 F.3d at 871 (“[T]he number of patent licenses needed to 
develop a drug may also affect the value placed on any single technology used 
in the development process. The cumulative effect of such stacking royalties can 
be substantial, particularly when reach-through royalties come into 
play.”(citation omitted)). 
182 See id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The right to conduct research 
to achieve . . . knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of [a] 
patent.”); Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he patent system both 
contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject matter, whether the 
purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation or comparison or improvement. 
Such activities are integral to the advance of technology.”). 
183 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19361 at *9 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001). 
184 Eric K. Steffe & Timothy J. Shea, Jr., Drug Discovery Tools and the 
Clinical Research Exemption from Patent Infringement, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 
REP. 369, 373 (2003). 
185 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental 
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L.REV. 81, 123 (2004). 
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use exemption to patent law has been essentially eliminated.186 
Judge Newman, in her dissent in Integra, explained that the 
essential elimination of the common law research exemption is 
“ill-suited to today’s research-founded, technology-based 
economy.”187 Judge Newman noted that technological progress and 
innovation would be hampered if even basic research were subject 
to infringement liability.188 She argued that there is a recognized 
distinction between “research” and “development.”189 Although 
Judge Newman agreed with the Integra majority that the safe 
harbor provision does not embrace the development and 
identification of new drugs,190 she argued that the common law 
research exemption should apply to these early research activities 
and that the statutory immunity of section 271(e)(1) should be 
triggered at the point at which the research exemption ends.191 
                                                          
186 See id. at 84. Although this note is not meant to be an analysis of the 
current state of the common law research exemption, a brief history of the 
doctrine is provided to give the reader some background. The common law 
research exemption was first developed by Justice Story when he stated that “it 
could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who 
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the 
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described 
effects.” Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
Justice Story further distinguished infringing activity from that of exempted 
research by holding that infringing activity “must be the making with an intent 
to use for profit,” whereas research is for “the mere purpose of philosophical 
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification.” Sawin 
v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). Since its development, the 
common law experimental use defense has been very narrow and strictly 
limited. Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The exemption 
is limited to actions performed for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry.” Id. When activities have the slightest commercial 
implication they do not fall under the common law experimental use exemption. 
Id. Moreover, activities in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged 
infringer also have been held to not qualify for the experimental use exemption. 
Id. 
187 Integra, 331 F.3d at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
188 See id. at 875-77. 
189 Id. at 876. 
190 Id. at 877. 
191 See id. at 876. 
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The extension of the now limited common-law research 
exemption to embrace early research would promote innovation by 
allowing drug companies more freedom to operate. Recently, the 
House Judiciary Committee recommended a proposed bill to the 
U.S. House of Representatives in an attempt to codify such a 
research exemption.192 The proposed legislation provides that the 
manufacture or use of a patented invention solely for research or 
experimentation will not constitute an act of patent infringement 
unless the patented invention has the primary purpose of research 
or experimentation.193 The proposal was intended to “create an 
incentive for the research and experimentation activities that fuel 
this country’s inventive genius and our vibrant economy.”194 Thus 
the proposed legislation was designed to promote innovation by 
allowing research on a patented invention while retaining the 
prohibition against research using a patented invention.195 
Although the proposed legislation would not exempt research tools 
from patent infringement, it is a step in the right direction. 
Research exemptions similar to those proposed in Congress 
exist in many foreign countries.196 In most of Europe, 
experimentation on the subject of a patented invention is exempt 
from infringement, while experimentation using a patented 
invention to achieve other results falls outside the exemption.197 
The enactment of a similar research exemption in the United States 
                                                          
192 136 Cong. Rec. H7498 (1990). This proposed legislation was entitled 
Title IV, Research, Experimentation and Competitiveness, of the Patent 
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990. 
193 Id. at H7499. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. Research exemption legislation for research into the subject matter 
of a patented invention is in accord with Judge Newman’s opinions set forth in 
Integra. Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman 
disagreed with the majority’s implication that Integra’s patents were research 
tools. Id. at 878. She argued that the defendants merely investigated the subject 
matter of Integra’s patents to develop improved RGD peptides, and therefore, 
should be immune from infringement under the common law research 
exemption. Id. at 875-78. 
196 See generally David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life 
Science Research, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 615, 648-56 (1994). 
197 Id. at 656. 
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would promote further innovation resulting from the investigation 
of and improvement on patented subject matters, and, 
simultaneously, protect the rights of research tool patent holders. 
A research, or experimental use, exemption in U.S. patent law 
could be analogized to the fair use doctrine of copyright law. The 
fair use doctrine, statutorily enacted in the 1976 Copyright Act, 
provides that certain socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works, 
such as research, criticism, and news reporting, will not give rise to 
liability for copyright infringement.198 The fair use doctrine has 
been recognized as necessary to stimulate the production of new 
copyrightable works.199 The doctrine has even been expanded to 
encompass unlicensed commercial uses.200 Rather than 
emphasizing the commercial nature of the use, the fair use doctrine 
focuses on whether the use furthers the goals of copyright law to 
promote science and the arts by developing new copyrightable 
works.201 “Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and 
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
                                                          
198 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). Stating in pertinent part: 
. . . [T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
199 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) 
(“[F]air use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
200 Id. at 572, 594 (explaining that the commercial nature of the use of a 
copyright does not render that use presumptively unfair). 
201 Id. at 579. 
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against a finding of fair use.”202 An expanded experimental use 
doctrine in patent law would lessen or alleviate the restrictions on 
research and development imposed by research tool patents and 
would likewise promote the goal of innovation.203 
Notably, the creation of too broad a research exemption for the 
purpose of promoting innovation may result in the absence of 
meaningful patent protection for drug discovery tools and a 
corresponding increase in trade secrets.204 An increase in trade 
secrets would both reduce public dissemination of research 
information and inhibit innovation.205 Innovation will be most 
spurred by facilitating the transfer of research tools. The National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) has released guidelines regarding the 
dissemination of research tools developed with NIH funds.206 The 
NIH has recognized that restrictions on the availability of research 
tools can stifle new discoveries and limit future avenues of 
research and product development to the immediate detriment of 
science and the long-term detriment of product development and 
public health.207 Thus, NIH discourages reach-through licensing on 
the basis that such royalty obligations can only dampen incentives 
for commercial development.208 
An alternative solution, especially for research tools not 
developed with NIH funding, is the creation of a compulsory 
licensing program for tools not readily available for licensing on 
                                                          
202 Id. 
203 See Mueller, supra note 155, at 43. 
204 Steffe & Shea, supra note 184, at 374. A “trade secret” is information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, 
or process, that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 1-1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1 (2004). 
205 Steffe & Shea, supra note 184, at 374. 
206 NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
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reasonable terms.209 Compulsory licensing might be effectuated in 
two situations: 1) where a patent holder refuses to license with the 
result of restraining trade or lessening competition, and 2) where 
the patent holder refuses to license and also does not use the 
patented invention.210 Thus, compulsory licensing would balance 
the patent holder’s exclusive right against the public interest in 
promoting commercialization of inventions and greater 
competition in drug innovation.211 Furthermore, compulsory 
licensing is consistent with the intellectual property obligations of 
member countries of the World Trade Organization.212 
Compulsory licensing would discourage research tool patent 
holders from keeping their tools for in-house or personal research 
only.213 Additionally, the enactment of legislation that requires 
compulsory licensing for research tool patents would establish a 
clear policy regarding licensing techniques and help to ensure that 
innovative drug companies will not be burdened by excessive 
licensing costs. Unfortunately, if a low-cost means of licensing 
research tool patents is not developed, the effects of Integra and 
the cost of stacking licenses on drug development will become 
prohibitive, resulting in less innovation and fewer new drugs. 
C. The Problem of Inefficient Patent Term Restoration 
In order to promote innovative research and discovery, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act provides for patent term extensions for 
innovative drugs whose patent terms are encroached upon by the 
                                                          
209 See Mueller, supra note 155, at 58. 
210 Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 389, 435 
(2002). 
211 Id. 
212 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Art. 31(b), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
(providing that compulsory licensing shall only be permitted if “the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
213 Strandburg, supra note 185, at 139. 
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FDA approval process.214 The patent term is essential for 
innovative drug companies that seek to recover the costs of new 
drug research and development once drugs reach the market.215 It 
is also necessary for the recovery of costs related to the research 
and development of drugs that either fail the approval process or 
fail in the market.216 Similarly, by allowing pioneer drug 
companies sufficient time to market their new drugs without 
competition from generics, the patent term enables the 
development of new products for the generics to copy and, 
therefore, encourages competition from generic manufacturers.217 
Unfortunately, drug patents do not provide the monopoly over 
a market that one might expect.218 Because more than one drug can 
have the same or similar effects, different drug companies may 
have patents on competing drugs and share the consumer 
market.219 A breakthrough drug usually exists between one and six 
years on the market before a therapeutically similar drug is 
patented and introduced.220 In addition, drugs are also forced to 
compete with alternative, non-drug therapies.221 
The Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to encourage innovation by 
allowing for patent term extensions for innovative drug patents to 
offset the portion of the patent term used during the FDA approval 
                                                          
214 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
215 PHARMACEUTICAL AND RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA 
(“PHRMA”), DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: 
THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 7 (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/ 
policy//2002-06-24.436.pdf [hereinafter DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE]. The 
average cost to develop a new prescription drug, including the costs of research 
and development failures, is nearly $1.7 billion. Thayer, supra note 3, at 23. 
216 Mandy Wilson, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic 
Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on 
Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 498-99 (2001); see also CBO STUDY, supra note 5, 
at 3. 
217 DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE, supra note 215, at 11. 
218 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 7. 
219 Id. at 3. 
220 Id. at xi. 
221 Id. 
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process.222 However, several limitations on patent term extensions 
hinder the achievement of this goal. First, patent term extensions 
cannot exceed five years.223 Second, the period between product 
approval and patent term expiration may not exceed fourteen 
years.224 Patent term restorations are also limited to a single patent 
whenever the drug is covered by multiple patents.225 Due to these 
restrictions, patent term extensions average about three years for 
new drugs.226 This is only a fraction of the average time spent on 
the approval process.227 Thus, the patent term extensions fail to 
restore the actual time and cost lost by innovative drug companies. 
The caps placed on patent term restoration have become 
increasingly burdensome in light of lengthening FDA approval 
periods.228 Due to additional preclinical screening of new drug 
candidates and the larger clinical trials required by the FDA, FDA 
approval times have increased.229 Given the delays associated with 
the FDA approval process, policy makers should consider 
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide for more meaningful 
patent term extensions. In order to provide incentives for 
innovation, patent term restoration should be extended to include 
the entire clinical approval process.230 Patent term restoration 
under the current rules assures that new drug products will receive 
                                                          
222 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002). 
223 Id. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2002). 
224 Id. § 156(c)(3) (2002). 
225 Id. § 156(c)(4) (2002). 
226 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 39. 
227 Id. at 17 (noting that the total development time after clinical testing 
begins before reaching FDA approval is, on average, 8.2 years). 
228 Id. 
229 Jill Wechsler, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Innovation Key Issues for 
2003, PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 2003, at 28, available at 
www.pharmtech.com/pharmtech/data/articlestandard/pharmtech/022003/42759/
article.pdf; see also Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for 
Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One 
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS, 110, 122 (Supp. 2 1996). 
230 In fact, the European Community has a more favorable incentive for 
drug development. Patent time lost during the clinical development period in the 
European Community is eligible for 100% restoration versus 50% in the United 
States. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 229. 
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below-average effective patent terms, making it more difficult for 
drug manufacturers to recover the costs of research and 
development and generate profits to fund further innovation. 
Inefficient patent term restoration is not the only obstacle to 
recouping the cost of developing new drugs. Even with the limited 
patent term extensions, generic drugs have reduced the total returns 
from marketing a new drug by approximately $27 million.231 The 
percentage of generic drugs on the market has greatly increased as 
a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act: from 13 percent in 1980 to 58 
percent in 1994.232 Once generic drugs become available, brand 
name drugs quickly lose more than 40 percent of their market.233 
By limiting drug patent terms to fourteen years from FDA approval 
and increasing the share of the market for generic drugs, the Hatch-
Waxman Act has effectively diminished the incentive to innovate. 
Integra, by precluding the application of the safe harbor to new 
drug products,234 has further eroded the incentive to innovate by 
increasing liability for and the cost of innovative research and 
development. 
D. The Stifling of Competition Between Innovative and Generic 
Drugs Companies 
In addition to creating higher costs for new drug research (and, 
ultimately, higher costs for consumers), Integra might also lead to 
abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of the purposes of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is to allow generic drugs access to the market 
immediately upon the expiration of the brand name drug’s 
patent.235 Yet the Act also provides pioneer drug manufacturers 
with a means of delaying the FDA approval of generic 
alternatives.236 In order to obtain FDA approval, a generic drug 
                                                          
231 CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 38. 
232 Id. at 37. 
233 Id. 
234 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
235 See Miller, supra note 20. 
236 Larissa Burford, In Re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, Anticompetitive Actions, and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY 
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company must file an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) with the FDA.237 The ANDA must do two things: 1) 
certify that the corresponding new drug patent has already expired, 
when it is to expire, or that it is invalid or is not infringed;238 and 2) 
notify the patent holder of the submission of the ANDA.239 Upon 
notice, the patent holder has forty-five days to file a patent 
infringement suit against the generic applicant.240 If an 
infringement suit is filed within the forty-five day period, the 
approval of the generic drug is automatically postponed for thirty 
months.241 These stays are advantageous to pioneer drug 
companies because they provide for more than two additional 
years of patent exclusivity. 
The exclusion of new drugs from the safe harbor may 
                                                          
TECH. L.J. 365, 368-69 (2004). 
237 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2003). 
238 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003) states: 
[A]n abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain a 
certification . . . that such patent has expired, of the date on which such 
patent will expire, or that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed 
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted 
Id. 
239 Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2003) states: 
[A]n applicant who makes a certification [under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)] . . . shall include in the application a statement that 
the applicant will give the notice required . . . to each owner of the 
patent which is the subject of the certification or the representative of 
such owner designated to receive such notice . . . . 
Id. 
240 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003) states: 
[I]f the applicant made a certification [under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)] . . . the approval shall be made effective immediately 
unless an action is brought for infringement of a patent which is the 
subject of the certification before the expiration of forty-five days from 
the date the notice . . . is received. If such an action is brought . . . the 
approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-
month period. 
Id. 
241 Id. 
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encourage pioneer drug companies to seek protection for their 
products by filing patent infringement suits to trigger the thirty-
month stay on the generic drug’s approval. By this means, pioneer 
drug companies can ensure longer market exclusivity to recover 
research and development costs and make a profit.242 Abuse of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in this manner can be attributed to insufficient 
patent term restoration and has become so prevalent as to prompt 
investigations by the Federal Trade Commission.243 In light of this, 
courts will be faced with frivolous lawsuits and consumers will be 
denied quicker access to cheaper generic alternatives. 
Innovative drug companies have employed a variety of tactics 
to delay the sale of generic drugs. One such tactic involves the 
negotiation of agreements between innovative and generic 
companies whereby generic companies receive a large payout in 
exchange for not releasing their products, thus enabling pioneer 
companies to maintain their market share.244 With a similar goal in 
mind, innovative companies have also begun to introduce their 
own generics into the market prior to the expiration of their brand-
name drug patents.245 Although this strategy does not preclude 
market access by other generics upon patent expiration, it has been 
noted that drugstores usually buy the first low-cost alternative to 
brand name drugs and rarely switch to other products once 
customers grow accustomed to the offered generic product.246 Both 
of these tactics risk possible antitrust violations, given that they 
substantially reduce market competition.247 Increased liability 
protection for new drugs at the research and development stage 
will assist in reducing the cost of bringing new drugs to market and 
will potentially decrease the incentive for pioneer drug companies 
                                                          
242 See Eurek, supra note 12, at 18. 
243 Id. 
244 Laura Giles, Promoting Generic Drug Availability: Reforming the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to Prevent Unnecessary Delays to Consumers, 75 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 357, 370 (2001). 
245 Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 229, at 114; Catherine Yang, The 
Drugmakers vs. The Trustbusters: The FTC is Eyeing Big Companies’ Tactics 
Against Makers of Generics, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 5, 1994, at 67. 
246 Yang, supra note 245. 
247 See Giles, supra note 244; see Yang, supra note 245. 
LADD MACROED FINAL 2-16-05.DOC 3/8/2005 12:56 PM 
 PATENT LAW AND NEW DRUG DISCOVERY 353 
to employ anticompetitive tactics. Presently, such violations of 
antitrust laws are likely attributable to the insufficient protection 
afforded to innovative research. 
E. The Possible Loss of Research and Development to Foreign 
Countries 
Without instituting some form of protection for innovative 
research, whether by applying a research exemption to new drug 
development or by implementing a low-cost research tool licensing 
program, the United States runs the risk of losing its innovative 
pharmaceutical industry to foreign markets. Many foreign 
countries have broader research exemptions than does the United 
States.248 For example, Japanese patent law provides for a general 
statutory experimental use exception that permits the use of any 
patented invention for experiment or research.249 Broad research 
exemptions in foreign patent law enable innovative drug 
companies to perform preclinical research abroad, beyond the 
reach of liability from U.S. patents on research tools. Alternatively, 
innovative drug companies might turn to countries with poor 
patent systems. Thus, if preclinical pharmaceutical research is not 
protected by a statutory safe harbor or by common law research 
exemptions, innovative drug companies may be enticed to perform 
their innovative research abroad. 
The relocation of innovative research to foreign countries has 
been facilitated by recent interpretations regarding the scope of 
section 271(g) of the Patent Act. Section 271(g) states that anyone 
who imports into the United States products made by a process that 
is patented in the United States will be liable for patent 
infringement.250 Two district court decisions have held that 
                                                          
248 Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 152, at 471. 
249 Jennifer A. Johnson, The Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A 
Model for U.S. Patent Law?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 499 (2003). 
250 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003). It states: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to 
sell, sells, or uses within the United States a products which is made by 
a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if 
the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during 
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infringement by importation under section 271(g) applies only to 
patented processes that produce physical, manufactured products 
and not to those that merely generate information.251 Recently, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed these holdings in Bayer AG v. Housey 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.252 The Federal Circuit decisively held that 
infringement under section 271(g) “is limited to physical goods 
that were manufactured and does not include information 
generated by a patented process.”253 Thus, section 271(g) provides 
extraterritorial protection for manufactured products and creates a 
loophole for research tool patents whose use results only in 
information on possible drug candidates.254 This interpretation of 
section 271(g) allows innovative drug companies to perform the 
research necessary to identify possible drug candidates abroad and 
to make use of the research results in the United States once the 
safe harbor applies. 
The availability of broader research exemption patent laws 
overseas, when viewed in tandem with judicial support for the 
importation of information obtained using U.S. process patents 
(including research tool patents), signals the potential loss of U.S.-
based innovative research in the future. Encouraging companies to 
conduct new drug development abroad will create a flow of 
                                                          
the term of such process patent. 
Id. 
251 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 
(D. Del. 2001) (“Upon a plain reading of the statute, the court finds that Section 
271(g) addresses only products derived from patented manufacturing processes, 
i.e., methods of actually making or creating a product as opposed to methods of 
gathering information about, or identifying, a substance worthy of further 
development.”) (emphasis in original); Synaptic Pharmaceutical Corp. v. MDS 
Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that the importation 
into the United States of reports on the results of diagnostic assays performed 
abroad were not infringed under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)). 
252 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
253 Id. at 1368 
254 See Richard J. Warburg & Stephen B. Maebius, Warning – Research 
Dollars at Risk!, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, available at http://www.foley. 
com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/1300/2003-24-03.pdf. 
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money, jobs, and new technology out of the United States.255 
Currently, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry invests a greater 
percentage of capital in research than do other American 
industries.256 As a key driver of economic growth, the 
pharmaceutical industry is a significant source of new, highly-
skilled jobs.257 The industry is one of this country’s largest 
employers, with approximately 223,000 employees nationwide.258 
The loss of the pharmaceutical research and development industry 
to foreign countries would therefore have a deleterious effect on 
the U.S. economy. To prevent an exodus of innovative research, a 
broader research exemption or a low-cost research tool licensing 
program must be established. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Integra may have brought the safe harbor back in 
line with Congress’s original intent of allowing generic 
manufacturers swifter access to the marketplace, it has done so 
with serious detriment to innovative drug discovery. Congress 
clearly stated that one of the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was to make available more low-cost generic drugs available.259 It 
is clear, however, that Congress also intended to create a new 
incentive for increased expenditures for research and 
development.260 The intended net effect of these two purposes is 
thrown off balance by Integra. 
Even before the decision in Integra, the incentive to innovate 
could be viewed as having been diminished as a result of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. The patent term extensions provided by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act still resulted in pioneer drug companies 
                                                          
255 Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyeth in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s 
Petition for Panel Rehearing and En Banc Rehearing, Integra LifeSciences I, 
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1052, -1065) at 9. 
256 PHRMA PROFILE 2003, supra note 7, at 11. 
257 Id. at 17. 
258 Id. 
259 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2647. 
260 Id. at 15. 
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realizing far shorter actual patent terms than innovators in other 
industries.261 Shorter patent terms mean less time to recover the 
cost of the development of new drugs. Recovering the cost of 
development is especially important because drug development is 
risky. Indeed, only one out of 5,000 potential new drugs developed 
ever gains FDA approval262 and the cost of developing a single 
drug can be more than half a billion dollars.263 The Hatch-Waxman 
Act, by facilitating the rapid entrance of generics into the 
marketplace, has, in turn, complicated the recovery of research and 
development costs by pioneer drug companies. 
The Integra decision ushered in an even bleaker environment 
for innovation. By denying the safe harbor protection to the 
preclinical development of new drugs, the decision exposes 
innovative drug companies to enormous patent liability. This 
liability results from the necessity of utilizing numerous patented 
research tools to develop new drugs. Without establishing clear 
guidelines regarding when innovative drug development may be 
protected by the safe harbor, Integra provides pioneer drug 
companies with little information as to when and for how long 
research tools must be licensed. This uncertainty may result in the 
necessity to license access to these tools on the basis of reach-
through royalties. Problematically, however, reach-through 
royalties reduce a manufacturer’s recovery of already-high 
research and development costs. To avoid the high cost of 
accessing necessary research tools, innovative companies may 
choose to perform innovative research abroad, given that the 
importation of information resulting from overseas research 
activities does not carry infringement liability.264 Or worse yet, 
innovative companies may choose not to conduct research at all. 
The importance of the Integra decision to the pharmaceutical 
industry is evidenced by ongoing efforts to seek review of the 
decision. Merck filed a petition for a panel rehearing or rehearing 
en banc by the Federal Circuit. Several other domestic innovative 
                                                          
261 DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE, supra note 215, at 9. 
262 PHRMA PROFILE 2003, supra note 7, at 3. 
263 See Thayer, supra note 3, at 23. 
264 See discussion supra Part III.E. 
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pharmaceutical companies similarly urged review of the 
decision.265 Furthermore, the legal and policy implications 
compelled the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to 
support the en banc review.266 On December 3, 2003, the Federal 
Circuit denied en banc review.267 Merck filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari on March 2, 2004.268 Two amicus briefs as well as the 
briefs of the parties were subsequently filed with the Supreme 
Court.269 On October 4, 2004, the Supreme Court invited the 
Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the 
United States.270 The United States filed an amicus brief on 
December 10, 2004 supporting review of the decision.271 On 
January 7, 2005, the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, as 
was Eli Lilly’s motion for leave to file an amicus brief.272 
Depending on the ultimate decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
                                                          
265 Brief Amicus Curiae of Eli Lilly; Combined Petition for Panel 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellant Merck KGaA, 
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 
02-1054, -1065); Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyeth in Support of Defendant-
Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and En Banc Rehearing, Integra 
LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-
1052, -1065). 
266 Petition of Amicus Curiae the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York for Rehearing En Banc, Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 
F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1052, -1065). 
267 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 02-1052, 02-1065, 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26547 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
268 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 
2003), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 2, 2004) (No. 03-1237). 
269 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., No. 03-1237 (U.S. 1999), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-1237.htm. 
270 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., No. 03-1237, 125 S.Ct. 
237 (Oct. 4, 2004). 
271 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Merck KGaA v. Integra 
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 237 (2004) (No. 03-1237), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/6invit/2003-1237.pet.ami.inv.html 
(concluding that petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted because “the 
court of appeals’ restrictive interpretation of Section 271(e)(1) will likely hinder 
the development of important and medically valuable new drugs.”) 
272 Merck KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 614, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3396 (2005). 
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may be time to consider possible legislation to determine the scope 
of the safe harbor as it applies to innovative drug discovery, 
particularly in light of the recent interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(g) as excluding from infringement liability the importation of 
information gained from the use of patented inventions.273 The 
nation’s economy and health are in serious danger without 
clarification of the patent laws as they apply to innovative drug 
discovery. 
 
                                                          
273 See discussion supra Part III.E. 
